Satellite Views of the Hermit Kingdom

New Perspectives on North Korea


Thomas B. Cochran and Matthew G. McKinzie

Berlin

February 24, 2004

NRDC Geo-Spatial Database of North Korea a new research tool to analyze security and human rights issues

- High resolution commercial satellite imagery first available to non-governmental researchers in 1999
- Ikonos (Space Imaging) sun-synchronous, 98minute orbit – produces a color photo at onemeter resolution [www.spaceimaging.com]
- QuickBird (DigitalGlobe) can achieve 61centimeter resolution under some conditions. [www.digitalglobe.com]
- Today's commercially available imagery is comparable to U.S. intelligence community of early 1970s
- Computing power current laptops have speed and memory comparable to the Cray II that went to LLNL in 1985
- New research can refine military estimates, provide additional data to the public



NRDC's Database of Military and Other Features in the DPRK (about 3,800 Records).

Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Basic Facts


- Occupies 120,000 sq km

 about the same size,
 population and latitude as
 New York State
- Population 22,700,000
- Coastline 2,495 km
- Borders Russia (19 km), China (1,416 km), ROK (238 km DMZ)
- DMZ extends 2 km on either side of a military demarcation line for 238 km from the Yellow Sea to the Sea of Japan



LandSat7 Image of the DPRK Capitol, P'yongyang, built along the Taedong River.


Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea Two Virtual Tours...



P'yongyang

DMZ





Tower of the Juche Idea, P'yongyang

Completed for Kim II Sung's 70th Birthday in 1982.

Design Attributed to Kim Jong II.

105-Story Ryugyong Hotel, P'yongyang.

Built for 1989 World Festival of Youth and Students, but never completed or opened.



DPRK Military Facts a Highly militaristic society...

- 23% of GDP for military (\$5.2 billion in 2002) (ROK 4%)
- 40 of 1,000 are in uniform (ROK 14 of 1,000)
- 1,200,000 active forces, 5,000,000 reserve, 4th largest in the world
- Army, Air Force, Navy and Special Operations Force (SOF)
- Military strategy 1) reunify Korean Peninsula under North Korean control within 30 days of the beginning of hostilities 2) defend North Korea
- Most important facilities underground
- DPRK Steadily Building a Nuclear Weapons Capability



DigitalGlobe photo of "Juche Tower," P'yongyang.

DPRK: an Underground Nation and Military After the Korean War experience, Kim II Sung said: "The entire nation must be made into a fortress."

- The degree to which the DPRK military is based underground is unique in the world takes advantage of mountainous topography;
- Virtually everything of military significance is underground – several hundred large facilities, more 10,000 smaller facilities;
- It is reported that thousands of artillery pieces are at underground sites; four tunnels have been discovered under the DMZ;
- Concealment of their military infrastructure from satellites and aerial reconnaissance make it an intelligence challenge;
- A verification nightmare for agreements limiting nuclear or other military developments in the DPRK.



Underground Air Force

Twenty air bases that have associated underground aircraft hangers

•	Airfield Name	Coordinates				
		Latitude	Longitude			
•	Changjin-up Air Base	40 21 51.9	127 15 50.1			
•	Hwangju Air Base	38 39 13.3	125 47 17.3			
•	Hwangsuwon Air Base	40 40 56.0	128 08 55.5			
•	Hyon-ri Air Base	38 36 47.8	127 27 04.5			
•	Iwon Air Base	40 21 37.9	128 43 08.4			
•	Kaechon Air Base	39 45 10.0	125 54 04.7			
•	Koksan Air Base (and Auxiliary Airstrip)	38 41 19.5	126 36 08.4			
•	Kuum-ni Air Base	38 51 55.1	127 54 12.6			
•	Kwail Air Base	38 25 32.2	125 01 09.4			
•	Nuchon-ni Air Base	38 14 16.7	126 07 13.4			
•	Onch'on Air Base Auxiliary Airstrip	38 53 14.0	125 16 49.9			
•	Orang Air Base	41 25 45.3	129 38 52.7			
•	Panghyon Air Base	39 55 38.4	125 12 28.1			
•	Pukch'ang Air Base	39 30 16.5	125 57 52.9			
•	Sunan Air Base/International Airport	39 12 25.7	125 40 09.8			
•	Sunch'on Air Base	39 24 41.8	125 53 27.5			
•	Taet'an Air Base	38 07 50.4	125 14 43.1			
•	Toksan Air Base	39 59 47.8	127 36 43.3			
•	U'iju Air Base	40 09 00.4	124 29 50.9			
•	Wonsan Air Base	39 09 56.4	127 29 06.9			

Underground Navy

Navy Bases with Submarine Caves

		Coordinates
•	Ch'aho-nodongjagu Navy Base	
	Entrance (1)	40 12 15N 128 39 00E
	Entrance (2)	40 12 06N 128 39 03E
•	Kosong Naval Facility	
	Entrance (1)	38 44 04N 128 12 45E
	Entrance (2)	38 44 00N 128 12 44E
•	Namae-ri Navy Base	
	Entrance	38 48 12N 128 08 17E
•	Puam-dong Navy Base	
	Entrance (1)	41 19 18N 129 46 05E
	Entrance (2)`	41 19 30N 129 46 12E
•	Songjin pando Navy Base	
	Entrance	39 22 18N 127 26 18E
•	Yoho'ri Naval Facility	
	Entrance (1)	39 52 33N 127 47 39E
	Entrance (2)	39 52 39N 128 47 17E

Other Underground Facilities (Purpose Unknown)

Haqap
 40 04 54N; 126 11 22E

- Kumchang-ni 40 06 43N; 125 07 47E (under construction)
- Other suspect underground facilities, whose locations are not publicly known, are cited in the literature

Selected NRDC Imagery & Data Database Feature Categories

- Air Bases and Defense
- Navy Bases and Commercial Ports
- Nuclear Facilities
- Missile Sites
- Political Prisons and Prison Camps (Forced Labor)



<u>Satphoto</u>: Hamhung, DPRK. NRDC has acquired images and highly detailed map data for nearly all major North Korean cities (database in red).

Korea People's
Air Force
(KPAF): Airfields
and Highway
Strips

56 Airfields: (surplus)
31 Hard Surface
25 Unpaved
19 Highway Strips

KPAF judged capable of a surge of offense operations at the start of a war and of guarding DPRK airspace during peacetime




Korea
People's Air
Force
(KPAF):
Divisional
Organization




Korea People's Air Force (KPAF): Observed Aircraft by Type



Korea People's Air Force (KPAF): Observed Aircraft by Number





*Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The Armed Forces of North Korea," (I.B. Tauris: London, 2001), p. 148.

DPRK
Fighter
and
Strike
Aircraft


Date of	KPAF Air Base	2	7			3	~			לריז	
Satellite		MiG-15	MG-17	MiG-19	MG-21	MiG-23	MG-29	Ϋ́		UAMG	_
Image		īĞ	Ę Į	īĞ	ig.	īĞ	ΪĞ	SU-25	SU-7	Ĭ	Total
		Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	Z	전	전	Ď.	Ĕ
31-Dec-03	Changjin-up				16						16
4-Jun-02	Hwangsuwon	2			15						17
29-Jun-02	lwon	6	14	17	20						57
	Kaechon										
10-Dec-02	(1st Air Div. HQ)	7	3	31							41
15-Oct-00	Koksan			18	32						50
21-Jun-02	Kwail		10		16					2	28
30-Mar-04	Nuchon-ni				9						9
23-Feb-04	Onch'on	21		63						7	91
	Orang										
15-Nov-02	(8th Air Div. HQ)	51								0	51
22-Nov-03	<u>Panghyon</u>		32		8			1			41
10-Mar-02	Pukch'ang				22	31				6	59
7-Mar-04	Sunch'on				15			18		2	35
	Toksan										
13-Apr-03	(2nd Air Div. HQ)				31						31
5-May-02	<u>V'iju</u>									20	20
22-Nov-02	Wonsan	28	5		13						46
	Total Observed						_		_		
	Aircraft	115	64	129	197	31	0	19	0	37	592
	Bermudez										
	Estimate	400	400	400	475	40	4.0				
	(Aircraft)*	190	120	180	175	46	16	36	20		783
	MCIA Estimate	_									
	(Regiments)**	5	5	2					1		$\vdash \vdash \vdash$
	MCIA Estimate										
	(Aircraft)**			>100	120	46		36	20		


^{*}Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The Armed Forces of North Korea," (I.B. Tauris: London, 2001), p. 148.

^{**}North Korea Country Handbook--Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA-2630-NK-016-97), May 1997, p. 36-38.




KPAF: F5 (MiG-15 Fagot)





KPAF: MiG-23ML/UB


Flogger G



third-generation fighter with limited all-weather and ground-attack capabilities

KPAF: Su-25/UBK Frogfoot A






DPRK Bomber Aircraft

Date of	KPAF Air	H-5, H-5R,
Satellite	Base	HJ-5
Image		
31-Dec-03	<u>Changjin</u> -up	10
5-May-02	Viju	35
	Total	45
	Observed	
	Aircraft	
	Bermudez	82
	Estimate	
	(Aircraft)*	
	MCIA	3
	Estimate	
	(Regiments)**	

^{*}Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The Armed Forces of North Korea," (I.B. Tauris: London, 2001), p. 148.

^{**}North Korea Country Handbook--Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA-2630-NK-016-97), May 1997, p. 36-38.



KPAF: HJ-5 (II-28 Beagle)



DPRK Transport Aircraft


#											
	Date of Satellite	KPAF Air Base)							_	
	Image		Y-5 (An-2 COLT)	An-24 COKE	II-14 CRATE	II-18 CO OT	II-62 CLASSIC	II-76 FALSIE	Li-2 CAB	Tu-134B CRUSTY	Tu-154B CARELESS
	2.14										
	8-May-02	Sondok	31						11		
	20-Apr-02	Sunan				1			2		
	8-Dec-03	Teachon	48								
		Total Observed									
		Aircraft	79	0	0	1	0	0	13	0	0
		Bermudez									
		Estimate									
		(Aircraft)*	300	10	5	4	6	3	14	2	4
		MCIA Estimate	>270								
		(Aircraft)**									
		MCIA Estimate	6								
		(Regiments)**									

^{*}Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "The Armed Forces of North Korea," (I.B. Tauris: London, 2001), p. 148.


^{**}North Korea Country Handbook--Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA-2630-NK-016-97), May 1997, p. 36-38.




KPAF: Y-5 (An-2 COLT)




the An-2 Holds Symbolic Value for the DPRK from the Fatherland Liberation War















































DPRK Navy/Maritime

Over 400 Selected DPRK Navy/Maritime Features in NRDC's Database: Piers, Wharfs, Dry-docks, Shipyards, Lighthouses, **Marine Products Industries, Cranes, Boat Ramps, Navy** Bases, Navy Barracks, **Surface Ships and Submarines** Sea of Japan Korea Bay Yellow Sea

Korea People's Navy (KPN): Bases

KPN Primarily a
Coastal Defense
Force—limited
capability to guard
DPRK territorial waters

West Sea Fleet: about 400 vessels in 6 squadrons
East Sea Fleet: about 500 vessels in ten squadrons

KPN training exercises are irregular and of short duration because of lack of fuel



KPN Coastal Diesel Submarines

20 Romeo/Whiskey (Length: 76-77 m)


28 Sang-o (Length: 35.5 m)

~ 47 Yugo (Length: 20 m) not found


Romeo produced by DPRK until late 1980's


Sang-o produced after 1980's

Two versions of Sang-o: attack and reconnaissance



KPN's Diesel Submarines





KPN's Largest Surface Ships


Frigates (74 m Soho and 102 m Najin)

Corvettes (62 m Sariwon)

Large Patrol Craft (58-62 m Taechong and Hainan)

The combat ships of the DPRK are a mixture of former-Soviet, Chinese and DPRK construction

A significant fraction of vessels are more than 20 years old and most are small in size



KPN's Frigate Najin (102 m)







Constructed within the DPRK

Armed with both guns and two SCRUBBRUSH missile launchers (46 km range, 500 kg warhead anti-ship cruise missile)

This Najin guards the DPRK's south-west coastline

KPN's Frigate Soho (74 m)

Armed with both guns and four SAFFLOWER missile launchers (85 km range 400 kg warhead anti-ship cruise missile)

Unique in that it is one of the largest catamaran-hull design ships in the world and the DPRK's only helicopter-capable vessel


We found it at an East Sea Fleet Base



KPN's T-Class Patrol Craft (62 m)




KPN SSM Missile Ships: PTG Soju (42 m)



KPN Kongbang Class Hovercraft (~20 m)








DPRK began constructing Kongbang class hovercraft in the late 1980's

Each can carry 40-50 troops at 50-60 miles per hour

Hovercraft can navigate the tidal flats and mud pools of the DPRK's Yellow Sea coast













Image Acquired: 04 April 2004





Romeo Diesel-Powered Submarines


Coastal Sang-O Class
Diesel-Powered Submarines

0 0 50 100 Meters



















Key DPRK Nuclear Sites


- Yongbyon Nuclear Research Center
- T'aech'on 200 MWe Graphite Nuclear Reactor (Unfinished)
- P'yongsan Uranium Concentrate Plant
- Pakch'on Uranium Concentrate Plant


















DPRK Missile Sites

Many missile bases are cited in the literature, but only the Musudan test facility has been identified in satellite imagery.









Nuclear Use Scenarios on the Korean Peninsula

- Recent Changes in U.S. Nuclear Policy;
- Potential Targets for U.S. Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons in North Korea;
- Nuclear Weapons Effects Simulation and Modeling

U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (December 2001)

- "More than 70 countries now use underground facilities (UGFs) for military purposes. In June 1998, the <u>Defense Science Board Task force on Underground Facilities</u> that there are over 10,000 UGFs worldwide. Approximately 1,100 UGFS were known or suspected strategic (WMD, ballistic missile basing, leadership or top echelon command and control) sites. Updated estimates from DIA reveal this number has now grown to over 1,400. A majority of the strategic facilities are deep underground facilities. These facilities are generally the most difficult to defeat because of the depth of the facility and the uncertainty of the exact location. At present the United States lacks adequate means to deal with these strategic facilities."
- "The United States currently has a very limited ground penetration capability with its only earth penetrating nuclear weapon, the B61 Mod 11 gravity bomb. This single-yield, non-precision weapon cannot survive penetration into many types of terrain in which hardened underground facilities are located. Given these limitations, the targeting of a number of hardened, underground facilities is limited to an attack against surface features, which does not does not provide a high probability of defeat of these important targets."

U.S. Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Force (February 2004)

"Nuclear weapons are needed that produce much lower collateral damage (great precision, deep penetration, greatly reduced radioactivity): have robust performance margins: are devised for ease of manufacture and maintenance: and produce special effects (e.g., enhanced EMP, enhanced neutron flux, reduced fission yield). The Task Force recommends that research be initiated on weapons that meet this new vision."

Proposed candidates for the Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator (RNEP)

- DOD asked for a study to determine if an existing warhead can be adapted, without nuclear testing, to destroy hardened, deeply buried targets.
- B61-11 a 400 kiloton, fixed yield bomb weighing ~545 kg approximately
 50 were converted in mid-1990s from the B61-7 nuclear bomb. LLNL design
- B-83 selectable yield, to 1.2 megatons weighing 1090 kg, LLNL design
- For FY 2005 administration requested \$27.5 million to continue feasibility and cost studies. The five year budget request (FY2005-2009) was \$484.7)
- House Energy and Water Development subcommittee on appropriations cut all of the money for the study (House Report 108-554, June 18, 2004, pp. 114-115)

Technical Limits of Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons

- Limited penetration in soil, concrete or rock, maximum 10-15 meters
- Cannot penetrate deeply enough to contain the nuclear explosion
- 1 kt at 20 foot depth eject 1 million cubic feet of radioactive debris, crater size of ground zero at World Trade Center
- Higher yield = more fallout

COUNTERING PROLIFERATION, OR COMPOUNDING IT?

The Bush Administration's Quest for Earth-Penetrating and Low-Yield Nuclear Weapons


Principal Author Christopher E. Pain


with
Thomas B. Cochran
Matthew G. McKinzi
Robert S. Norris



Natural Resources Defense Council May 2003












Casualty Calculations from a Hypothetical Nuclear Attack on the Pukch'ang Air Base




Nuclear Weapon Fallout Radiation Dose Total (9.54-1048.1 microns) at 17-Oct-04 12:00Z (48.0 hrs)




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


Nuclear Weapon Fallout Radiation Dose Total (3.54-4769.5 microns) at 17-Oct-04 12:00Z (48.0 hrs)














Casualty Calculations from a Hypothetical Nuclear Attack on the Ch'aho Navy Base












Ch'aho and Pukch'ang: Discussion


- Casualty estimates—primarily from fallout—will vary greatly depending on target location (potentially controllable) and ambient wind speed and direction (probably not controllable) ...we illustrated this for two specific targets;
- While fallout is reduced with reduced yield, a 5 kt EPNW at 20 meters depth of burial still produces a lot of fallout!


Calculating a Hypothetical Nuclear Attack on Seoul: Reviewing the Data from Hiroshima and Nagasaki




Calculating a Hypothetical Nuclear Attack on Seoul: Reviewing the Data from Hiroshima and Nagasaki


Distance from hyp	ocenter (km)):	1	2	3	4	5	6
Outdoors (unshielded)	blast injury	high I		low				
	burn	high mod		moderate	low			
	radiation injury	hig	h	moderate	low			
Outdoors (shielded)	blast injury	low						
	burn	low						
	radiation injury	mod	derate	low				
Inside (wooden house)	blast injury		hi	gh	moderate		low	
	burn	low						
	radiation injury	mo	derate	low				
Inside (concrete building)	blast injury		lo	w				
	burn	low						
	radiation injury	mod- erate	low					







Calculating a Hypothetical Nuclear Attack on Seoul: HPAC Casualty Calculations



Seoul: Discussion

- Because of the higher population density of Seoul (2004) versus Hiroshima and Nagasaki (1945), predicted casualties for the same kind of nuclear attack (air burst) are as much as six times worse;
- If the attacking nuclear weapon were a ground burst producing fallout, predicted casualties could be more than ten times worse and damage to South Korea would include widespread contamination.

Conclusions

- Development of nuclear weapons by North Korea and development of EPNW by the United States are destabilizing, dangerous and could lead to their use.
- While not demonstrated here, it would appear that underground aircraft parking areas and navy caves can be defeated by conventional means.
- These potential targets could also be defeated using existing surface burst nuclear weapons. The casualties from earth penetrator weapons will be greater than surface burst weapons of the same yield.
- The only sensible alternative is a diplomatic resolution of the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula.

