US-Russia Nuclear Security Cooperation:
Fissile material: ending production and reducing stockpiles


While US-Russia nuclear security cooperation centers around preventing horizontal proliferation - that is, the spread of nuclear weapons and related material, technology and know-how to states or non-state actors that do not yet have them - some measures are meant to address the potential for vertical proliferation - that is, the expansion of already existing nuclear arsenals. Seeking agreement on ending fissile material production and reducing existing stockpiles fall into the latter category. While the US and Russia are currently far from wanting a general stop of fissile material production, the will to reduce the growing stock piles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium is stronger due to commercial interests in the civilian nuclear industry, who wants to use the access material for reactor fuel.


Ending further production of fissile material
  • Elimination of weapons-grade plutonium production program
Reducing existing fissile material stockpiles
  • The HEU Purchase Agreement
  • Plutonium Disposition Agreement
  • Long-Term Non-proliferation Initiative
  • Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR)



Ending fissile material production

While the US and Russia agreed in 1995 not to produce more fissile material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium) for use in nuclear weapons, agreeing to a general halt of fissile material production has proved more problematic. The US does not currently produce any fissile material for either nuclear weapons- or civilian purposes. However, the Bush Administration has shown interest in recycling plutonium for nuclear energy purposes, a move that would break the US 'anti-reprocessing' policy, a nonproliferation measure initiated by the Ford Administration in 1976. Russia still has three reactors in operation that produce weapons-grade plutonium at an estimated annual rate of 1.5 tons. While the plutonium is not needed for weapons purposes the reactors supply heat and electricity in the two nuclear cities where they are located, in Zheleznogorsk (formerly Krasnyoarsk-26) and Seversk (formerly Tomsk-7). Furthermore, Russia is bent on developing a closed nuclear fuel cycle, in which plutonium reprocessing and recycling plays an important part. While there have been rumours in the past that Russia would announce a plutonium reprocessing moratorium, current nuclear energy plans make this unlikely.

  • Elimination of weapons-grade plutonium production program
    administered through the US Department of Energy
    In 1994, the two countries signed the Agreement on the Closure of Plutonium Production Reactors and the Cessation of Use of Newly Produced Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons, foreseeing the closure of the three last weapons-grade plutonium producing reactors by 2000 and replacing them with alternative sources of energy. The agreement also prohibited the United States and Russia from restarting any plutonium producing reactors that have already been shut down. However, MINATOM, the Russian nuclear ministry, opposed to the project and insisted on nuclear replacement and consequently, the closure project evolved into the reactor core conversion project and in 1997 the core conversion agreement was signed as an amendment to the original 1994 closure agreement.

    The original plan of the reactor core conversion project was to modify the fuel composition in the three weapons-grade producing reactors to produce less plutonium of poorer isotopic quality less suited for weapons use. However, the project has continuously been plagued with bureaucratic, cost, safety, technical and nonproliferation issues and in 2000 the project came to a halt after Russia considered abandoning it. The initial cost estimate for the project was around $150 million but this figure has doubled since. In 2001, Russia proposed a protocol to the 1997 agreement extending the production of plutonium the reactors until the end of 2005 and 2006 and partial replacement of the reactors with fossil fuel power plants. Discussions on how to proceed are ongoing and in 2002 DOE assumed funding responsibility from the Department of Defense.

Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission documents

In 1993, the US and Russia established the Joint Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation (also known as the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission) with the mandate to support cooperation on space- and energy related issues. The first sub-committee formed was the Energy Policy Committee with emphasis on encouraging cooperation on nuclear energy issues. An additional goal of the Energy Policy Committee was to reduce the Risks of Nuclear Power and of Dismantlement of Nuclear Weapons, which gave impetus to, inter alia, the following documents:

US Government documents

Other resources



Reducing existing fissile material stockpiles

The US and Russia produced during the cold war enormous stockpiles of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for use in nuclear weapons. The US has designated 225 tons as excess fissile material (174.3 ton HEU and 52.5 ton plutonium and Russia has designated 550 tons (500 ton HEU and 50 ton plutonium, which is increasing by 1.5 ton per year. See section on Ending fissile material production). Russia has a long-standing interest in using its excess fissile material - and selling it - as nuclear fuel. Nuclear security cooperation in this area focuses on how to make use of the HEU and plutonium for nuclear energy production purposes.

  • HEU Purchase Agreement
    Under this 1993 accord, the US is to purchase over 20 years Russia's 500 ton HEU designated as excess material. The deal was originally estimated at a value of $12 billion and was to be implemented with a commercial mechanism. The material is being converted to low enriched uranium fuel in Russia and ultimately used in civilian power reactors in the US. Handling the implementation for the US is the private company USEC, Inc. (formally state-owned US Enrichment Corporation).

    As of August 2001, Russia had converted 125 ton HEU and shipped it in nuclear fuel form to the US. But implementation has suffered in general by the drop in market price for low-enriched uranium. Complaints from USEC - who feels it is paying above market price for the uranium - have led to a protracted dispute over price and compensation. Russia threatened to withdraw from the agreement in 1998 saying it would rather sell natural uranium on the world market. To save the agreement, the US signed a new agreement in 1999 on compensating Russia $325 million for the uranium content of shipments that USEC did not pay for. Russia and USEC, Inc agreed on new pricing terms in early 2002 and deliveries of fuel resumed in late April 2002.

  • Plutonium Disposition Agreement
    administered through the Department of Energy
    In September 2000, the US and Russia signed the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement (pdf) committing each country to dispose of 34 tons of excess plutonium, which the goal of render it unusable for nuclear weapons. While Russia has decided to convert all of its 34 tons into Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) for nuclear power reactors, the US originally designated around 17 tons for MOX fuel production and slated the rest for immobilization and storage in self-protecting radioactive glass logs. The MOX fuel option has been widely criticized for being counter-productive as a nonproliferation measure since it involves plutonium reprocessing and encourages the use of plutonium in the fuel cycle. In January 2002, the US government announced its abandonment of the immobilization option and thus will also fabricate MOX fuel from all of its designated excess plutonium.


    The US Department of Energy is working with Russian agencies to assist with Russia's disposition efforts. Although no agreement has been reached yet, multilateral funding from the G8 is supposed to help Russia constructing warhead disassembly, reprocessing, and MOX fabrication facilities. Partial funding in the form of loans can be supplied through the Russian Fissile Materials Disposition Loan Guarantee Act of 2001, introduced in the US Senate and House of Representatives by senators Domenici and Lugar. It proposes to guarantee loans to Russia for the purposes of canceling debt, supporting nuclear nonproliferation activities, or developing energy infrastructure, including nuclear. The bill would authorize loans up to $1 billion. For every $20 million in loans, Russia must place one ton of highly enriched uranium and one ton of weapons plutonium under permanent International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) control.

  • Long-Term Non-proliferation Initiative
    Administered through the US department of Energy
    Under the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) proposed by the Clinton Administration in early 2000, $100 million was requested (and allocated) for (a) complementing funding for existing programs ( MPC&A and NCI) and (b) creating incentives for Russia to end the separation of its civil plutonium and better manage its civil spent nuclear fuel:
    • Prevention of Civil Plutonium Separation (no funding for FY 2002)
      Aim: assist Russia to construct a dry storage facility for spent fuel stemming from the RT-1 plant at Mayak. Currently, the spent fuel is reprocessed into weapons-usable plutonium.
    • Spent fuel Storage and Repository Cooperation (no funding for FY 2002)
      Aim: support development of geologic repository in Russia for nuclear waste.
    • Research Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program (funding level kept for FY 2002 - $1 million)
      Aim: facilitate acceptance of HEU spent fuel from outside Russia stemming from Russian designed reactors.

  • Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR)
    administered through the US Department of Energy
    This project aims to assist Russia with modification of research reactors from using HEU (weapons-usable material) as fuel to low-enriched uranium fuel. The US and Russia cooperate on the development of replacement fuel and the necessary conversion of the reactor cores to accept the new fuel.

US government documents and reports

Other resources