While US-Russia nuclear security cooperation centers around
preventing horizontal proliferation - that is, the spread of
nuclear weapons and related material, technology and know-how
to states or non-state actors that do not yet have them - some
measures are meant to address the potential for vertical proliferation
- that is, the expansion of already existing nuclear arsenals.
Seeking agreement on ending fissile material production and
reducing existing stockpiles fall into the latter category.
While the US and Russia are currently far from wanting a general
stop of fissile material production, the will to reduce the
growing stock piles of plutonium and highly enriched uranium
is stronger due to commercial interests in the civilian nuclear
industry, who wants to use the access material for reactor fuel.
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Ending further production
of fissile material |
- Elimination of weapons-grade plutonium production program
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Reducing existing
fissile material stockpiles |
- The HEU Purchase Agreement
- Plutonium Disposition Agreement
- Long-Term Non-proliferation Initiative
- Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR)
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Ending fissile material production
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While the US and Russia agreed in 1995 not to produce more fissile
material (plutonium or highly enriched uranium) for use in nuclear
weapons, agreeing to a general halt of fissile material production
has proved more problematic. The US does not currently produce
any fissile material for either nuclear weapons- or civilian purposes.
However, the Bush Administration has shown interest in recycling
plutonium for nuclear energy purposes, a move that would break
the US
'anti-reprocessing' policy, a nonproliferation measure initiated
by the Ford Administration in 1976. Russia still has three reactors
in operation that produce weapons-grade plutonium at an estimated
annual rate of 1.5 tons. While the plutonium is not needed for
weapons purposes the reactors supply heat and electricity in the
two nuclear cities where they are located, in Zheleznogorsk (formerly
Krasnyoarsk-26) and Seversk (formerly Tomsk-7). Furthermore, Russia
is bent on developing a closed nuclear fuel cycle, in which plutonium
reprocessing and recycling plays an important part. While there
have been rumours in the past that Russia would announce a plutonium
reprocessing moratorium, current nuclear energy plans make this
unlikely.
- Elimination of weapons-grade plutonium production program
administered through the US Department of Energy
In 1994, the two countries signed the Agreement
on the Closure of Plutonium Production Reactors and the Cessation
of Use of Newly Produced Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons,
foreseeing the closure of the three last weapons-grade plutonium
producing reactors by 2000 and replacing them with alternative
sources of energy. The agreement also prohibited the United
States and Russia from restarting any plutonium producing reactors
that have already been shut down. However, MINATOM, the Russian
nuclear ministry, opposed to the project and insisted on nuclear
replacement and consequently, the closure project evolved into
the reactor core conversion project and in 1997 the core
conversion agreement was signed as an amendment to the original
1994 closure agreement.
The original plan of the reactor core conversion project was
to modify the fuel composition in the three weapons-grade producing
reactors to produce less plutonium of poorer isotopic quality
less suited for weapons use. However, the project has continuously
been plagued with bureaucratic, cost, safety, technical
and nonproliferation issues and in 2000 the project came to
a halt after Russia considered abandoning it. The initial cost
estimate for the project was around $150 million but this figure
has doubled since. In 2001, Russia proposed a protocol to the
1997 agreement extending the production of plutonium the reactors
until the end of 2005 and 2006 and partial replacement of the
reactors with fossil fuel power plants. Discussions on how to
proceed are ongoing and in 2002 DOE assumed funding responsibility
from the Department of Defense.
Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission documents
In 1993, the US and Russia established the Joint Commission
on Economic and Technological Cooperation (also known as the Gore-Chernomyrdin
Commission) with the mandate to support cooperation on space-
and energy related issues. The first sub-committee formed was
the Energy
Policy Committee with emphasis on encouraging cooperation
on nuclear energy issues. An additional goal of the Energy Policy
Committee was to reduce the Risks of Nuclear Power and of Dismantlement
of Nuclear Weapons, which gave impetus to, inter alia,
the following documents:
US Government documents
Other resources
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Reducing existing fissile
material stockpiles |
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The US and Russia produced during the cold war enormous stockpiles
of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium for use in nuclear
weapons. The US has designated 225 tons as excess fissile material
(174.3 ton HEU and 52.5 ton plutonium and Russia has designated
550 tons (500 ton HEU and 50 ton plutonium, which is increasing
by 1.5 ton per year. See section on Ending fissile
material production). Russia has a long-standing interest
in using its excess fissile material - and selling it - as nuclear
fuel. Nuclear security cooperation in this area focuses on how
to make use of the HEU and plutonium for nuclear energy production
purposes.
- HEU Purchase Agreement
Under this 1993 accord, the US is to purchase over 20 years
Russia's 500 ton HEU designated as excess material. The deal
was originally estimated at a value of $12 billion and was to
be implemented with a commercial mechanism. The material is
being converted to low enriched uranium fuel in Russia and ultimately
used in civilian power reactors in the US. Handling the implementation
for the US is the private company USEC, Inc. (formally state-owned
US Enrichment Corporation).
As of August 2001, Russia had converted 125 ton HEU and shipped
it in nuclear fuel form to the US. But implementation has suffered
in general by the drop in market price for low-enriched uranium.
Complaints from USEC - who feels it is paying above market price
for the uranium - have led to a protracted dispute over price
and compensation. Russia threatened to withdraw from the agreement
in 1998 saying it would rather sell natural uranium on the world
market. To save the agreement, the US signed a new agreement
in 1999 on compensating Russia $325 million for the uranium
content of shipments that USEC did not pay for. Russia and USEC,
Inc agreed on new pricing terms in early 2002 and deliveries
of fuel resumed in late April 2002.
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Plutonium Disposition Agreement
administered through the Department of Energy
In September 2000, the US and Russia signed the Plutonium
Management and Disposition Agreement (pdf)
committing each country to dispose of 34 tons of excess plutonium,
which the goal of render it unusable for nuclear weapons.
While Russia has decided to convert all of its 34 tons into
Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) for nuclear power reactors, the US
originally designated around 17 tons for MOX fuel production
and slated the rest for immobilization and storage in self-protecting
radioactive glass logs. The MOX fuel option has been widely
criticized for being counter-productive as a nonproliferation
measure since it involves plutonium reprocessing and encourages
the use of plutonium in the fuel cycle. In January 2002, the
US government announced its abandonment of the immobilization
option and thus will also fabricate MOX fuel from all of its
designated excess plutonium.
The US Department of Energy is working with Russian agencies
to assist with Russia's disposition efforts. Although no agreement
has been reached yet, multilateral funding from the G8 is
supposed to help Russia constructing warhead disassembly,
reprocessing, and MOX fabrication facilities. Partial funding
in the form of loans can be supplied through the
Russian Fissile Materials Disposition Loan Guarantee Act of
2001, introduced in the US Senate and House of Representatives
by senators Domenici and Lugar. It proposes to guarantee loans
to Russia for the purposes of canceling debt, supporting nuclear
nonproliferation activities, or developing energy infrastructure,
including nuclear. The bill would authorize loans up to $1
billion. For every $20 million in loans, Russia must place
one ton of highly enriched uranium and one ton of weapons
plutonium under permanent International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) control.
- Long-Term Non-proliferation Initiative
Administered through the US department of Energy
Under the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI) proposed
by the Clinton Administration in early 2000, $100 million was
requested (and allocated) for (a) complementing funding for
existing programs ( MPC&A and NCI) and (b) creating incentives
for Russia to end the separation of its civil plutonium and
better manage its civil spent nuclear fuel:
- Prevention of Civil Plutonium Separation (no funding
for FY 2002)
Aim: assist Russia to construct a dry storage facility
for spent fuel stemming from the RT-1 plant at Mayak. Currently,
the spent fuel is reprocessed into weapons-usable plutonium.
- Spent fuel Storage and Repository Cooperation (no funding
for FY 2002)
Aim: support development of geologic repository in Russia
for nuclear waste.
- Research Reactor and Nuclear Fuel Acceptance Program
(funding level kept for FY 2002 - $1 million)
Aim: facilitate acceptance of HEU spent fuel from outside
Russia stemming from Russian designed reactors.
- Reduced Enrichment for Research and Test Reactors (RERTR)
administered through the US Department of Energy
This project aims to assist Russia with modification of
research reactors from using HEU (weapons-usable material) as
fuel to low-enriched uranium fuel. The US and Russia cooperate
on the development of replacement fuel and the necessary conversion
of the reactor cores to accept the new fuel.
US government documents and reports
- Report to Congress:
Disposition of Surplus Defense Plutonium at Savannah River Site,
DOE, February 2002
- White
House Fact sheet on Plutonium Disposition, July 2000
- Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission
fact sheet on U.S.-Russian Plutonium Production Reactor Agreement,
1997
- Cost
Estimates for the Disposition of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Withdrawn
from Russian Nuclear Military Programs, 2nd report of the
joint US-Russia working group on cost analysis and economics
in plutonium disposition, March 2001
- DOE
related ETRI efforts, Rose Gottemoeller, acting DOE deputy
administrator for defense nuclear nonproliferation, testimony
before the US Senate Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
7 March 2000.
- CRS
Issue Brief: Nuclear Weapons: Disposal Options for Surplus Weapons-Usable
Plutonium, 22 May 1997
- Report of the Joint
US-Russian Working Group on Cost Analysis and Economics of Plutonium
Disposition, April 2000
Other resources
- CNS NIS Nuclear Profiles Database
- RANSAC
- Nuclear Control Institute
- Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Reports on Pu Disposition
- Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium:
Reactor-Related Options, Study by the US National Academy
of Sciences, July 1995.(press
release)
- Technical
Aspects of the Use of Weapons Plutonium as Reactor Fuel,
By Arjun Makhijani, Science and Democratic Action, May
1997
- Plutonium
and Reprocessing of Spent Nuclear Fuel, Science,
28 September 2001
- Plutonium Disposition:
Non- Proliferation or Industry Welfare?, European Security
Review, April 2001
- Final
Report of the US-Russian Independent Scientific Commission on
Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, June 1997
- Chronology: Implementing
and related developments, Pu Disposition Agreement (July 1998
- April 2000)
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